The United States, Saudi Arabia, and arms: prospects for future instability in the alliance by Goodwin, Bonita Anne.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1993-12
The United States, Saudi Arabia, and arms:
prospects for future instability in the alliance
Goodwin, Bonita Anne.








THE UNITED STATES, SAUDI ARABIA, AND ARMS:




Principal Advisor: Ralph H. Magnus
Associate Advisor: Robert E. Looney
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
\ 94-10960
11111 lIl~I1IlM til 1 11illi 94 4 11 0 7 8
Unclassified
Security Classification of this page
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
Is Report Security Classification: Unclassified lb Restrictive Markings
2a Security Classification Authority 3 Distribution/Availability of Report
2b Declusification/Downgrading Schedule Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
4 Performing Organization Report Number(s) 5 Monitoring Organization Report Number(s)
6a Nam of Performing Organization 6b Office Symbol 7a Name of Monitoring Organization
Naval Postgraduate School (if applicable) *38 Naval Postgraduate School
6c Address (city, state, and ZIP code) T7 Address (city, state, and ZIP code)
Monterey CA 93943-5000 Monterey CA 93943-5000
Sa Name of Funding/Sponsoring Organization 6b Office Symbol 9 Procurement Instrument Identification Number
EI(if applicable)
Address (city, state, and ZIP code) 10 Source of Funding Numbers
Program Element No Project No ITask No lWork Unit Accvsion No
II Title (include security classification) THE UNITED STATES, SAUDI ARABIA, AND ARMS: PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE INSTABILITY IN
THE ALLIANCE
12 Personal Author(s) Goodwin, Bonita A.
13a Type of Report 13b Time Covered 114 Date of Report (year, month, day) 115 Page Count
Master's Thesis j From To December 1993[ 81
16 Supplementary Notation The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position
of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
17 Cogati Codes 118 Subject Terms (conti, ue on reverse ifnecessary and identify by block number)
Field Group aSubgroup Saudi Arabia United States Arms Political perceptions
Field _ Group __ ubgrop lOil Defense Expenditures Economic Stability Middle East
19 Abstract (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
The primary purpose of this research is to examine Saudi Arabia's relationship with the United States as it pertains to Arms. In examining this hi-lateral
relationship, the research will attempt to answer two questions: First, what is the United States government's view on arms sales to its allies and how does it
effect Saudi Arabia? Secondly, since the Reagan administration, Persian Gulf War, and the demise of the U.S.S.R, what factors of instability within Saudi
Arabia, may be indicators, that the U.S.should re-evaluate its Arms policy. The methodology used will be a historical and economic assessment of U.S. and
Saudi Arabian Arms relationship, with particular focus on the economic and political weaknes, within Saudi Arabia, and implications they may have for
instability in the region.
.-.- ~~-~-lj 1,- r- ,:'; T17D 3
1.,AA 1... 14.M L .A.-...."
20 Distribution/Availability of Abstract 21 Abstract Security Classification
_X_ unclassified/unlimited _ same as report _ DTIC users Unclassified
22a Name of Responsible Individual 22b Telephone (include Area Code) 22c Office Symbol
Ralph H. Magnus (408) 656-2294 NS/ Mk
DD FORM 1473,84 MAR 83 APR edition may be used until exhausted security classification of this page
All other editions are obsolete
i UNCLASSIFIED
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
The United States, Saudi Arabia, and Arms: Prospects for Future Instability in the Alliance
by
Bonita Anne Goodwin
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.A., Hampton University, 1986
Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of






AM M sL Principal Advisor
Robert E. Looney, Associate Advisor
Thomas H. Bruneau, Chairman
Department of National Security Affairs
ABSTRACT
The primary purpose of this research is to examine Saudi Arabia's relationship with the United
States as it pertains to Arms. In examining this bi-lateral relationship, the research will attempt to
answer two questions:
First, what is the United States government's view on arms sales to its allies and how does it
effect Saudi Arabia?
Secondly, since the Reagan administration, Persian Gulf War, and the demise of the U.S.S.R,
what factors of instability within Saudi Arabia, may be indicators, that the U.S. should re-evaluate
its Arms policy.
The methodology used will be a historical and economic assessment of U.S. and Saudi Arabian
Arms relationship, with particular focus on the economic and political weaknesses within Saudi
Arabia, and implications they may have for instability in the region.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND THE FORMATION OF THE HOUSE OF SAUD
Saudi Arabia and the United States have in the past
sixty years developed a special relationship based on mutual
goals and security interests. The relationship has for the
most part been mutually rewarding to both nations, however,
during brief periods in our histories, our policies and
actions seemed to antagonize and perplex the other. Yet Saudi
Arabia's need for U.S. assistance, our need for access to the
region and its oil, have seen this relationship mature, into
a close militarist alliance. Evidence that this relationship
continues to be reinforced, was seen in 1990/91, when the U.S.
and Saudi Arabia cooperated in the Persian Gulf War.
In order to understand the impetus behind Saudi Arabia's
all consuming drive for security we must first look at the
conditions in which the nation was formed
A. BIRTH OF A NATION
The foundation of the al-Saud monarchy had its beginnings
in the simple union of two men with common visions; Muhammad
ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Muhammad ibn Saud.
1. Wahabbism
Eighteenth century Saudi Arabia was the combination of
a vast and virtually undefined land mass, that was inhabited
1
by many nomadic tribal groups. These groups often competed and
fought with one another for territory, power, profit, and
various tributes.
The tribal based demographic structure of Saudi Arabia
has been an asset to the regime contributing
significantly to the stability of the political system'
It was in this environment that the Wahabbi brand of Islam was
first inspired.
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab was a religious preacher.
"He was born in 1703 in the town of Uyaynah into the Banu
Sinan tribe." 2
As an adult Mohammed bin Abd al-Wahhab abhorred what
he saw as the moral degeneration in his society, and advocated
a return to Islamic purity. This stringent form of Islam held
as one of its fundamental tenets:
a return to simple and pure beliefs, austere living and
strict application of the law of early Islam. It condemned
prevalent saint worship, animistic rituals, indulgence in
'Adeed Dawisha., Saudi Arabia's Search for Security
(Britain: Eastern Press LTD, 1980), P. 13
2Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahabbi was considered a child prodigy
and was encouraged by his family, who had a number of noted legal
scholars on Islamic law in it, to study Islam. They sent him to
study at the finest religious schools in Mecca, Medina, and Bashra.
Influenced by fourteenth century scholar Hanbal Taimiya who
advocated a return to the Quran and the Sunna. He also stated that
primary sources of error were the bida (innovations) that had
gained acceptance since the establishment of the Islamic community.
Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab only accepted the Quran, the Hadith
(selected readings on the prophets life,) and the Tafsir
(interpretations of ibn Kathir and al Baghawi) see pg 106, 8 for
more information Richard F. Nyrop, ed., Saudi Arabia : A Country
Stu (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985),
p.21
2
luxuries such as smoking, music, wearing of silk, and
laxity in the application of Qoranic prescriptions and
penalties 3
Some of the other tenets of Wahhabism are:
"* Reassertion of unity with god (Tauhid) and brotherhood of
all believers
"* condemnation of all forms of Shirk (vices e.g., saint
worship, smoking, alcohol etc.)
"* emphasize the omnipotence of God
"* absolute submission to God
"* all believers are equal and united in the umma
(community) 4
The zealous manner in which Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab
preached against these vices, the local religious leaders, and
governing authorities of his time, did nothing to endear him
to his town, and eventually he was expelled. In 1744, he was
to meet a man of equal ambition and vision and together they
would form the foundation for the modern state of Saudi Arabia
3These vices were called shirk and those who engaged in these
type activities were considered to be living in a state of
Jahaliyah (state of ignorance) Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The
Ceaseless Ouest For Security (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1988), p.9 See Nyrop., p.106 for more information on the Ikwhan
4 Wahhabis object to the being referred after Muhammad bin Abd
al-Wahhab because it implies undue elevation of the sects founder.
They refer to themselves as tauhid or muwahhidun (people of unity
or Unitarians) and the movement as al dawa al najdiya ( The Najd
call) Nyrop., p. 106,7
3
2. Mohammed ibn Saud
... For centuries the pattern of political loyalty in the
tribal community was hierarchial with authority focused on
the sheikh, or tribal chieftain.., the sheikh acted as the
central authority, the final arbiter of power,and the
ultimate dispenser of justice. 5
Muhammad ibn Saud was just such a man. He was the
sheikh of a small tribe in Dar'iyya. His encounter with
Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab led to an agreement by both parties
to be obedient to god and to rid the surrounding countryside
of its vices. The quest for power and a return to Islamic
purity (Wahhabism) was the foundation of the Saudi Kingdom,
but it was also a catalyst for internal and external
conflicts, that saw the loss of power of the al-Saud family
through inter family competition and external invasion.
B. MODERN SAUDI ARABIA
The modern state of Saudi Arabia is only sixty-one years
old. Abd al-Aziz (Ibn Saud), was the twenty year old son of
Abd al-Rahman who was the architect of modern Saudi Arabia.
After the second loss of power of the al-Saud family in 1884
Ibn Saud decided to regain his ancestral claim and in a
surprise attack reclaimed Riyadh. Through sheer determination,
meticulous use of the principles of his religion, and
militarism he reconstructed the rule of the al-Saud family. In
his efforts to ensure stability of the regime, he began to
5Dawisha., p.13
4
establish tenets that would later define Saudi Arabian foreign
policy in the future.
First the development of a diplomatic style that was
based on a traditional and
tribal code of ethics, usually characterized by
ambiguity, discretion, a penchant for covert action, use
of proxies, attempts to buy allies, and avoidance of
confrontation with the appeasement of powerful opponents 6
The complex national character of modern Saudi Arabia can
be attributed to its adherence to Islamic principles, historic
regional rivalries, and the diverse regional politics created
with the end of world war I.
The dissolution and division of the Ottoman Empire between
Russia, Great Britain, and France, was a watershed event in
the history of the Middle East that had two significant
results:
First it, transformed the Middle East, from provinces with a
virtual uniform political entity, and centralized
administrative authority, to regions and states with diverse
political status.
7
6Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security
(New York: Cornell University Press, 1988) p.111-12
7 The division of the Ottoman territory under the Sykes-Picot
agreement gave Russia Constantinople, a few miles hinterland on
either side of the Bosporus, and Eastern Anatolia, France reserved
the greater part of Syria, Southern Anatolia, and Mosul, and Great
Britain claimed a southern portion of Syria, Iraq, and the ports of
Haifa and Acre. Palestine was reserved for special international
administration. This secret document was a violation of pledges
made by Sir Henry McMahon to Sharif Husain, that if Husain would
form an alliance with Great Britain, and lead a revolt against the
Turks, Great Britain was prepared to give mutual assistance,
recognize Husain as Caliph, and grant Arab independence to all
Arabs in the regions proposed by the Sharif. George Antonius, The
Arab Awakening (Lebanon: Librairie Du Liban, 1969)p. 325
5
Secondly, the formulation of five new states:
... The Kingdom of Hejaz (King Husain), the sultanate of
Najd and its dependencies (sultan Abdul-Aziz Ibn Saud), the
imamate of the Yaman (Imam Yahya), the territory of Asir (the
Idrisi Muhammad), and the principality of Shammar (Ibn
Rashid).8
The creation of these states was not without its problems,
boundary and religious disputes, caused tension in the
relations between the states. Ibn Saud saw increased dangers
in a post Ottoman world for Saudi Arabia. Security threats
involving two of his neighbors, as well as problems from
internal elements, made unification of his new kingdom
problematic.
... danger from the direction of Jabal Shammar had
increased as the war gave the Turks a strong interest in
reinforcing their Rashidi allies, and a new much more
serious threat had developed from the Hijaz as a result of
The British decision to invest massively in an alliance
with the Sharif Hussain. Both problems were complicated by
renewed tribal rebellions family dissension, and unrest
stemming from the disruptions caused by the British
blockade, and by extremist pressures from the fanatic
Ikhwan fighters.
Muhammad ibn Saud possessing much more influence and
military power than King Husain and his other neighbors
a Ibid., p.326
9 The development of the Ikwhan was an attempt by ibn Saud to
transfer the loyalty of the Bedouin tribes from one tribal leader
to the House of Saud, instill Wahhabi principles,and have a readily
available standing army. He later had to disband them in order to
preserve the kingdom due to their penchant for violence, see
Safran., p. 36,7
6
systematically began to overpower his opponents and
consolidate his Kingdom.
This began with the overthrow and annexation of Shammar,
the taking of Asir as a protectorate, and eventually the
Kingdom of Hejaz.10
Due to this fractious and conflict ridden early history
Saudi Arabia's monarchy, is constantly pursuing policies that
will enhance the security of the country externally, and
insure its own internal stability. Because their history has
been dominated by issues of preservation of the newly
established kingdom, there is a propensity to secure the means
and the method that would ensure a heightened sense of
security. This constant need for security permeates all facets
of Saudi society and continues to have a profound and long
lasting influence on the country to this day.
The successors of Ibn Saud while still dealing with
succession issues gave their primary attention to the
preservation of the kingdom from Iraq and Jordan. This
required the securing of allies (British & American) to aid
them in their defense build up. The use of petro dollars was
to become central to this endeavor
1 0Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia The Ceaseless Quest For
Security (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), p.44,47,49
7
C. DISCOVERY OF OIL
The constant defense of the kingdom, left the Saudi
treasury depleted.
With the onset of the Great Depression, the flow of
pilgrims to Mecca slowed to a trickle, this annual event was
the major source of the King's revenues. Bills went unpaid,
salaries of civil servants were six to eight months in
arrears, and Ibn Saud's ability to pay tribal subsidies, which
constituted one of the most important glues bonding a
disparate kingdom, caused unrest to develop throughout his
realm1 1
This coupled with the fact that the British government
"held a conference in Kuwait of Arab leaders under her
subsidy, and informed them the subsidy would stop"1 2 , forced
Ibn Saud to look for other means of investment, most
expectedly he turned to the west. Influenced by the
exploration for oil in other areas of the Arabian peninsula,
Ibn Saud sought to grant a concession to a foreign company for
oil exploration in Saudi Arabia.
Jack Philby a British merchant in Jidda and a friend
of the King, recommended Charles Crane, and in 1931
the Saudi exploration project began.13
"Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Ouest for Oil. Money. and
Power (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991) p. 286
12 Sydney N. Fisher, William Ochsenwald, The Middle East A
History_ (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1990), p. 547
13Fisher and Ochsenwald., p. 288
8
The kingdom still needed a large lump sum of cash in
advance which bogged down negotiations, however
by May 1933, the final draft of the concession agreement
between Standard oil of California (SOCAL) was signed. The
agreement entitled the Saudis to received 175,000 in gold
in advance, 18 months later 100,000 and another 500,000
when SOCAL discovered oil in 1938.14
14eri.,p 21 30
.aud ,Arabi toda isteorls l
S8 ach193 p. c,15 col 2
Sou : WO
14 Yergin., p. 291, 300
IsSaudi Arabia today is the worlds largest exporter. It
continues to increase its share of the worlds oil market, with its
1991 discovery of Hillah and Dilam oil fields), Thomas W.
Lippman, "A Desert Kingdoms Growing Oil Dominance, " The Washington
Post, 18 March 1993, p. c 15 col 2
World War II (WWII), saw Saudi Arabia struggle
financially, although oil was now bringing in more money, it
was still not enough to maintain Ibn Saud's vast empire,
particularly.. .when much of it was being squandered due to
inefficient banking methods and lavish spending16
In the post war era, Saudi Arabia fared much better due to
European demand, however it was so great, Ibn Saud soon
realized more pipelines would have to be built to fulfill all
requests.
In 1947 work was started on a new pipeline and by 1950 the
1,068 mile line was completed, giving Saudi Arabia the
capacity to produce 300,000 to 500,000 barrels a day.17
Ibn Saud's treasury was now increasing and his financial
problems were abating. When it came time for the signing of a
new concession he was able to bargain from a position of
strength. He saw that he was not being paid the full value for
his oil and so in 1950 a new concession with the Arab American
Oil Company (Aramco) was negotiated.
In it Saudi Arabia would get four gold shillings at an
eight and a quarter rate per ton; a 20 % tax on Aramco
profits, and certain duties and taxes or 50% of Aramco
profits whichever was greater. This was retroactive to the
first of January. Increasing 1950 royalties from 60-90
16Fisher and Ochsenwald., p.550
17Fisher and Ochsenwald., p.551
10
million. This forever changed the way oil royalties were
determined in the Middle East.18
Upon Ibn Saud's death he left a dynasty one that has
fought, cajoled, and co-opted its enemies. It has established
its legitimacy internally and throughout the region. It is
this monarchy that the United States has formed an enduring




II. UNITED STATES AND SAUDI ARABIA
A. U.S. AND SAUDI RELATIONS
The United States relationship with Saudi Arabia began and
until recently was strengthened by three main strategic
concerns:
"* Oil
"* Stability in the region to ensure continued access to that
resource
"* Contain Soviet expansion into the region
These goals became more critical with the British decision
to relinquish the last remnants of its control over the
Arabian Peninsula in 1968. As British influence in the Persian
Gulf region diminished, the United States role with many of
the Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia increased.
Preventing the Soviet Union from gaining the capability to
deny access to the resources in the Gulf, became a central
focus in U.S national security planning. From the U.S.
perspective:
... the Soviet Union had much to gain and very little to
lose by instigating and exploiting tensions in the Gulf.
The west, notably the United States and Great Britain, has
been the status quo power, with significant interest and
influence at stake and great vulnerability of dependence
on Gulf oil.. .access to Gulf oil is but of marginal
interest to the Soviet Union in terms of its own future
12
energy needs, the ultimate concern has been the sufficient
Soviet control of that oil by whatever variety of means:
as to alter critically the east-west strategic balance 19
Clearly the U.S.S.R. could not be allowed to have freedom
of operations in the Gulf, this would undermine U.S.
initiatives in the region. The United States realized that its
oil and strategic interests were best served when regional
conflicts were at a minimum.
The Anglo-American strategy strived for these ends, via
methods that included both diplomatic exhortation and
providing civilian and military technology2 0
While oil remains of vital interest to the U.S., the
demise of the Soviet Union has made the environment in which
nations interact significantly different. No longer is it a
bi-polar system, with the United States and Soviet Union as
opposing superpowers, each with its list of regional proxies,
and the U.S.solely concerned with Soviet expansion into the
Middle East. The U.S must presently concern itself with a
multi-polar system that is less stable, due to numerous
regional powers who have various and sundry conflicts, that
make relations between them more fractious and unpredictable.
The United State's Arms policy was tailored for Cold War
realities. Military Assistance for our allies was an integral
part of that policy, as President Reagan stated in a 1981
directive:
19 joseph W. Twinam, "U.S. Interests in the Arabian Gulf",
American Arab Affairs no. 21 (Summer 1987): 13
20Twinam., p. 3
13
the United States must not only strengthen its own
capabilities, but be prepared to help its friends and
allies to strengthen theirs through the transfer of
conventional arms and other forms of security
assistance
2 1
Saudi Arabia became a major beneficiary of U.S Arms
policy. This chapter will seek to examine U.S. national
security make up and mutual interests between the two
countries.
B. THE UNITED STATES AND NATIONAL SECURITY
1. Grand Strategy
The Grand strategy approach has greatly influenced U.S
foreign policy in the Middle East. This policy entails a
formulation that "embraced the full range of political,
economic, and military factors. It also sought to integrate
policy functionally and geographically 2 2
The following are some core concepts that are
indicative of the United States Grand Strategy in the Gulf:
0 Strategic planning is not limited to the operational and
logistic dimensions of the use of force; it involves the
full range of political, economic, and military
instruments(e.g., political persuasion, and the use of
force etc)
2 1 Roger P. Labrie, John G. Hutchins, Edwin W.A Peura, and
Diana H. Richman, The U.S. Arms Sales Policy: Background Issues,
(Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, 1982), pp.15
221.0. Lesser., "Oil, the Persian Gulf, and Grand Strategy:
Contemporary Issues in Historical Perspective', (CA: The Rand
Corporation, 1991), pp. 3
14
"* theaters of conflict (or potential conflict are not
considered in isolation. A broader strategic milieu is
critical important in determining range of options
"* the strategy must reflect factors important to national
security. (e.g. judgements of potential adversaries
vulnerabilities, which are dependent upon factors of
internal political, social, and economic cohesion) 2 3
The U.S. Grand strategy which focuses on long range
planning, has been quite successful and advantageous when
applied to its relations with Saudi Arabia. The applicability
of this strategy to Saudi Arabia and its subsequent placement
at the forefront of U.S. strategic planning in the Middle
East, was due to its fulfilling four important criteria used
in determining policy for the region:
"* role in assuring national security
"* place in assuring economic prosperity (i.e., oil)
"* place in strategic perceptions of U.S. and potential
adversaries
"* abilitY4 to promote/hinder U.S. objectives in the
region
This strategy is important if the U.S wishes to stay
abreast of events in the region in which it has diverse
interests (i.e. oil, passage through vital waterways,
commercial enterprises etc.)
With the end of the Cold war the U.S. must take into
account risk associated with sustained involvement in a
country, its diminished force and fiscal capabilities, and
23Lesser., p.3
24 Lesser., p. 6
is
reciprocity (assistance politically and economically from our
allies for financial and military assistance rendered). The
latter issue of reciprocity is crucial when examining the
relations of the U.S and Saudi Arabia.
the Saudis tend to take liberties with parties whose
strategic interests are locked with theirs. In some cases,
that tendency merely takes the form of trying to get a
free ride on the other party's endeavor to protect its
interests2 5
In order to accomplish this evaluation, the U.S must
first determine what were the mutual interests that helped to
forge the relationship, and what has significantly changed
since the Cold war and the Gulf war, that may warrant a shift
in our Grand strategic alliance with the Kingdom.
C. MUTUAL SECURITY AND REGIONAL INTERESTS
1. Co-munism
The United States role as one of the leading global
powers and world opponent of Communism was a goal that was
mutually compatible with the Saudi regime. The House of al-
Saud whose foreign policy style is quiet and who is typically
reticent about overt support of western allies, was vigorous
in its pursuit of any signs of Communist infiltration into the
region. This was quite acceptable to the U.S., but the Saudis
2 5A key example of this behavior is the Saudis relying on the
United States to check Soviet threats and to secure navigation in
the Gulf, while refusing to contribute anything themselves. Or the
cutting of oil production in 1979 even while counting on the U.S.
to continue to fulfill those strategic functions Safran., p. 456
16
resolve was attributed, as it always is, to its own security
concerns. The fact that its agenda was synonymous with U.S.
plans for the region was an added plus, however the opposition
of Communism would have been pursued by the Saudi regime even
if it were not a priority or national security concern for the
U.S. The Saudis perceived Communism
as diametrically opposed to their governing style for two
primary reasons:
First, the belief that Communism was disruptive;aiming to
undermine the conservative status-quo powers such as Saudi
Arabia... Secondly, it was atheistic and consequently
anti-Islamic 26
The Saudis generous financial aid program on the
peninsula has been an attempt to curtail or prevent the
expansion of Communism. Most of the states receiving the aid
were on her borders (Yemen, Oman, Bahrain etc.), so it was a
policy that was in her best interest to pursue virulently.
2. Security
At the root of the relationship is the concern for
stability which culminates in states desire to align
themselves with other states that can enhance their security
posture. For the United States the Saudi connection was and
continues to be important for several reasons:
2 6 Dawisha., p.20
17
the Red sea and Suez canal, the Persian Gulf and the flow
of oil, the Indian ocean and Soviet Naval strategy east of
the Suez Canal, the Arab-Israeli conflict ... and U.S.
military presence in the region2 7
Clearly this was not a unilateral relationship but a
symbiotic one, where concern for oil and Soviet expansionism
created an atmosphere where both parties prospered from their
closer association.
2 7 Emile A. Nakhleh., The United States and Saudi Arabia: A
Policy Analysis (Washington D.C. : American Enterprise Institute,
1975), p. 49
18
III. THE UNITED STATES, SAUDI ARABIA, AND ARMS
A. Patterns of Development
While the scope of this research deals specifically with
the time frame 1980 to 1993, the pattern of development of the
Arms relationship between the U.S and the Saudi Kingdom did
not mature in a historical vacuum, the seventies and the
administrations that presided over that decade were the
forerunners of the Arms policy that the U.S. presently
operates under.
The early seventies under the Nixon administration, saw a
U.S arms policy that was a direct result of lessons learned in
the Vietnam war about U.S. intervention in foreign countries.
the Nixon Doctrine declared that the U.S would respect its
treaty commitments and continue to help its friends and
allies, through military and economic assistance, but
would look to the nation directly threatened to assure the
primary responsibility for providing the manpower for its
defense 2 8
By the mid-seventies Saudi Arabia along with Iran was
already viewed as vital to U.S national security. In fact the
two countries were considered the twin pillars of the Middle
East, bastions of stability for the peninsula, regional
policeman against Soviet expansion, and protectorate of U.S.
interests. President Nixon's policies on arms sales were very
28Labrie, Hutchins, Peura, and Richman., p. 8
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broad, especially when it came to supplying arms to Iran.
Saudi Arabia received military and economic assistance but it
did not compare to the access the Shah of Iran enjoyed. These
transfer of arms to the Middle East were often criticized
domestically but went virtually uncontested.
The latter part of the seventies under the Carter
administration saw an arms policy fraught with good intentions
but overcome by the political realities that are inherent in
the Middle East. The Carter administration was against the
Nixon administration free use of arms as a foreign policy
tool. One of his first directives was:
a call to place controls on transfers to all nations
except members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.... conventional
arms sales would become an exceptional foreign policy
implement, to be used only in instances where it can be
clearly demonstrated that the transfer contributes to U.S.
national security interests 29
The Carter doctrine while instituting some constraints
really did not change the military assistance or arms sales
policy from the previous administration significantly. The
Shah of Iran up until the overthrow of his monarchy in 1979,
still had carte blanche access to U.S arms and the Saudis were
making incremental increases in their weapon purchases.
29 Carter felt that since the United States was the premier
arms producer, constraints on our production would slow down the
arms race and ease tensions in the Middle East,. This policy was
generally referred to as Unilateral restraint because it did not
take into account the arms manufacturing capability of the other
nations specifically the U.S.S.R. Ibid., p. 10
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1. 1980"S
The United States Policy that dictated the direction
and tenor of relations with Saudi Arabia, in the eighties was
the Reagan doctrine. The United States had recently come
through some very disastrous foreign policy failures in the
Middle East. One pillar of stability in the region, the
Pahlavi regime in Iran was overthrown by Islamic
Fundamentalists, an oil crisis that sent shock waves through
the domestic economy, and several American hostage and
terrorist incidents. In addition to this the Soviet Union was
feared to be achieving strategic parity with the U.S. and
expanding into Middle Eastern areas such as Afghanistan.
This left Saudi Arabia as the other pillar to bear the
brunt of U.S. policy, a task they were all to willing to
perform, as it further increased her influence in the eyes of
the international community and the region. This reliance on
the Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia was a major
influence on the Reagan administration who leaned toward an:
Arab-centric view that moderate states of the Gulf -
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab
Emirates presented the backbone of U.S. security interests
in the Persian Gulf region3 0
The Reagan administration's policies differed
considerably from the Carter administration in several key
areas:
3 0Eric Hooglund., "Factions behind U.S. Policy in the Gulf"
Middle East Report (March-April 1988):31
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0 that the Soviet union is the largest arms supplier and
therefore arms sales are necessary to counteract the
Soviet threat
* arms sales are not a precursor of instability but are
means in which governments can maintain internal and
regional peace
* unilateral restraint was detrimental to U.S. national
security as it opened the door for U.S. competitors to
undermine the industry and gain influence in the Middle
Eastern region
* that a vital and imaginative defense industry was integral
to our defense and national security interests 31
The latter half of the eighties under the Bush
administration was a continuance of the Reagan doctrine.
However it was the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein, that
seemed to cement and validate all the years of increased
interactions and cooperation between the two countries.
The Persian Gulf war cut across the sacred notion of
Arab unity, Islamic brotherhood, and respect for another
nations sovereign rights. The division that the Gulf war
caused between the Arab states and the unequivocal support
that the Saudi regime gave the U.S. was a clear departure from
its typically reticent security policies.
2. 1990's
The post Gulf war environment sees both the United
states and Saudi Arabia having to reckon with some of the
consequences (economic and political) associated with the
massive arms transfer required to eliminate the security
3 1Labrie, Hutchins, Peura, and Richman., p. 16
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threat posed by Saddamx Hussein. It is yet too early into the
decade and the Clinton administration, to discern any clear
divergence from the Reagan/Bush administration's policies
concerning arms and prospective foreign sales. However, the
U.S. defense industry has several large contracts with Saudi
Arabia which are critical to their economic survival, if they
are to remain competitive and viable entities in the future,
particularly in this time of defense cutbacks.
B. ARMS SALES
Historically Saudi Arabia sought to align itself with
countries that wielded great military power and influence. It
wasn't until the great transfer of wealth from the western
nations to the oil producing nations of the Middle East, that
Saudi Arabia was able to afford a modern security force. Saudi
Arabia's defense expenditures have increased annually, even
during the economic stagnant periods, when the bottom dropped
out of the oil market, Saudi Arabia continued to place a high
priority on the attainment of sophisticated weapons.
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Due to this one tract focus on arms procurement, particularly
in the eighties, the Saudi Kingdom has become "the largest
recipient of U.S. military sophisticated weaponry" 3 2
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At the root of the issue of arms sales, lies a
sovereign nations concern with security. In Michael Howard's
The Causes of War he makes the observation that:
the causes of war remain rooted in the perceptions of
statesmen of the growth of hostile powers and fear for the
restriction, if not extinction of their own. The threat or
rather fear has not changed whether it comes from
dreadnoughts, number of men under arms, or missilesystems3Y
32
"Saudi Arabia"., Fro£r in, 16 February 1993
Table III-1 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1991
33Michael Howard., The Causes of War,(Cambridge: Harvard University Press), p.21
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as long as these perceptions exist and the attainment of ever
increasing numbers of sophisticated weaponry are considered to
be a sign of prestige and strength, nations will pursue them
at all cost.
Arms sales are more than just commercial ventures,
they are instruments of foreign policy. They are also:
"* instruments of diplomacy used to build closer relations
with the U.S. or foreign avoid a foreign nations
deterioration
"* a means to buy influence and unseen leverage for use at
critical times when the U.S. needs the support of foreign
powers
"* they are symbolic; sales to certain countries have far
reaching implications for other countries (i.e., the
selling of weapons to Saudi Arabia is viewed unfavorably
by Israel and vice a versa)
"* signals alliance building or joint military ventures
indicates greater commitment by the United States in
providing military training, equipment, ammunition, and
overall military and technological support'' 3 4
most important is the degree of probability that:
when a foreign nation is significantly dependent on the
United States arms and becomes engaged in a conflict it
can force the United States into difficult choices 39
This last statement was proven valid with the United
States involvement in the Persian Gulf war. Saudi Arabia's
purchase of the most advanced weaponry, did not stop it from
asking for U.S assistance in repelling Iraq's challenge.
3 4Barry M. Blechman., The Politics of National Security,
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p.112
35Ibid., p. 112
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The Saudi military force due to limited personnel
have always required many U.S. military personnel, and
technicians to run its military equipment. With few skilled
personnel to operate these sophisticated weapons, the U.S. is
in many ways inextricably tied to the Kingdoms conflicts. This
weakness highlights a serious dilemma, the Saudis need a
strong military to protect their interests in the region, yet
they fear strong military will be an internal security threat.
So they pursue numerous arms and if a regional conflict arises
"rush sufficient manpower to fortify the location and hold on
until the Americans arrive" 3 6
C. U.S ARMS SALES AND SAUDI ARABIA
The increase in profitability of arms sales is ideal to
those entities involved from a solely commercial perspective.
However, when nations become involved in arms sales, the issue
can not be compartmentalized, politicization is inevitable,
36 The Saudi military is made up of two distinct groups;the
regular forces (the Army, Navy, and Air), whose mission is to
defend the monarchy from foreign threats and the National Guard who
protects the House of Saud from internal threats. The National
Guard are descendants of those who fought in Abdul Aziz 's bedouin
army and the former are drawn from the urban classes. The upper
echelons of the military structure are reserved for the royal
family. Occasionally there is some degree of tension and rivalry
between the two factions of the Saudi military. Yet in the
perception of the monarchy it is better to have them divided
against themselves were they can be managed, rather than united
against the monarchy. Sandra Mackey., "The Billion Dollar Two Bit
Army", The New York Times, 15 August 1990, p. B7
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and the outcome of arms decisions are affected by various
economic and political factors.
1. The Decision Making Process
The procurement of arms by a foreign nation typically
goes through four phases:
"• U.S. Defense Surve - surveys are done on requesting
nations. They are typically in response to a regional
threat. These surveys are used to assist the U.S. in
making recommendations on what weapon systems would best
meet that nations security need
"* Interagency reviews - this agencies mission is to evaluate
the recommendation of a particular weapons system, this
will result in two other interviews:
- Disclosure interview - determines the extent
of classified information required for the
sale. This task is coordinated between
National Disclosure Panel (NDP) chaired by the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS),
in concert with members of the State, Defense,
and JCS military departments. Its mission is
to evaluate the recommendations and ensure it
is advantageous to U.S. interests
-Interagency Policy Review - examines issues
such as can the country afford the military
equipment, can it integrate it into its
existing force, how will the arms transfer
effect the regional military balance, and the
potential impact on U.S. readiness
"* National Security Council Review - significant sales are
reviewed for final recommendation to the President
"* Conaressional Notification and Review - mandated under
section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). It
requires that congress be notified at least 30 days prior
to an issuance of a letter of offer 3 7
"37Craig M. Brandt., ed., Military Assistance and Foreign
Policy (Ohio: Department of the Air Force, 1990), p. 114-17
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In the process to determine arms policies and the
eventual allocation of weapons, all players are aware that the
stakes are high, and that their are tangible (i.e.,arms,
training, and money) and intangible (i.e., influence, power,
and access) benefits to be gained.
The fact that the Saudi Government is the major
recipient of U.S. arms in the eighties does not mean that
there were not concerns on U.S. sales to the Kingdom. Many of
these concerns focused on:
the lack of agreement in supporting the Camp David Peace
Accords, perceived threats to Israeli society, purchase of
weapons from other nations, and possible third party
transfer of missiles .... 38
The issue of profit vs U.S. national security
interests is one the U.S. confronts frequently, particularly,
in the present environment where arms control and non-nuclear
proliferation rhetoric are the politically correct positions
to advocate. The United States needs a clearer policy and
posture on arms. Advocating arms control while at the same
3 8U.S. Committee on Foreign Relations, Arms Policies in the
Persian Gulf and Red Sea Areas: Past. Present, and Future,
(Washington D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), p.39
Saudi Arabia has in the past shown the inclination to purchase from
other countries such as China, Brazil, France and Britain. Also in
1986 Saudi Arabia sent U.S. manufactured bombs to Iraq despite it
being in violation of agreed upon arms transfer rules. There is
also speculation that they may have sent Patriot data to China. I
suspect that this is another incidence where security concerns were
paramount over U,S, interests and formal agreements. for more
information see "Saudi Arabia sent U.S. made bombs to Iraq in '86
Despite Transfer Limits"The Wall Street Journal 20 April 1992 p.
A12 and "Saudis deny sending Patriot data to China," LoAngel
Times 30 March 1992, p. A9
28
time being the worlds second leading arms exporter points at
the duplicitous nature of our policy. The following table
clearly identifies this weakness 3 9
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Faudi Arabia in the eighties was a major purchaser of
military hardware from the United States and from 1984-88 was
second only to Iraq in arms purchases.
4 0
Amu imports. iv'*-a6 Tol armed force.
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39 Table 111-2 Arms Exports of Leading Exporting Countries
Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1991)
40Table 111-3 Countries that Drive the Arms Race
Sources: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1989-90 p.9
World Military Balance 1990-91, Human Development Report 1991
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2. Anti-Warning Aircraft (AWAC)
The most controversial arms deal of the eighties was
the 1981 sale of the Anti-Warning Aircraft (AWAC) missile
package to Saudi Arabia.
a. 1981
Saudi Arabia had been lobbying The Carter
administration in 1979 for the sophisticated aircraft however,
it was put on a low priority due to election and campaign
issues. With the advent of the Reagan administration the
Saudis again renewed their request for F-15 equipment updates
and AWACS. The Administration agreed to both requests,
however it tried to link the purchase with a foreign policy
initiative called strategic consensus:
due to concern with soviet expansion, the
administration attempted to form a defensive framework
in the Middle East to counter these threats.. .provide
a forum for them to work through regional conflict...
The arms deals was supposed to provide an inducement
to rally around this policy4 1
The Congress after a heated debate on the weapon sale
voted to oppose the sale. This was a direct result of Crown
Prince Fhad's negative statements about the Camp David
Accords, U.S. policy on the Palestinian issue, and support for
Israel. It was the increasing danger and regional conflict
that eventually turned congress around and at the end of 1981
they approved the sale of the weapons to Saudi Arabia.
4 1Safran., p.328
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In 1986 when the planes were ready for delivery,
congressional opposition again flared up as members were not
pleased with the Saudis support of the PLO and anti-Israel
stance. As California Senator Alan Cranston who led the
campaign stated:
That we (congress) want to make it clear that it is no
longer in the national interest of the U.S. to sell
advanced weapons to a nation that consistently scorns
American interests 4
2
The 1981 agreement had an addendum to it that
stipulated that in order for the approval of the sale certain
guidelines must be followed by the Saudi Government:
"* take more definitive steps in providing leadership to
facilitate negotiations in the Arab/Israeli peace process
"* condemn support of terrorist activities and governments
that engage in these activities (Libya, Syria, PLO etc.,)
"* protect AWAC technology
"* operation of the aircraft in only Saudi territory 43
After a close vote and a lot of political capital
expended by President Ronald Reagan, the delivery of the
planes to Saudi Arabia were approved.
This upward trend of weapon procurement was to
continue until 1989 when expenditures for weapons skyrocketed.
42 By a vote of 73-22 Congress approved measures to block the
sale of the weapons to Saudi Arabia Congressional Ouarterly, "Both
Chambers say no to Saudi Arms Deal," May 10, 1986 P. 1020
4 3
"Saudi Arabia" Middle East Contemporary Survey, Vol. X
1986, p. 565
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The advent of the Gulf War saw the Saudis out pace their Gulf
neighbors in weapons procurement (cost in millions of U.S.
dollars) 44
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b. Future Aspects of Arms policy and sales
Arms sales for the United states and many other
nations is a lucrative commercial export market, that has an
impact on their domestic economy. The Gulf war took its toll
on Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Middle East. "Arms
"44Table 111-4 U.S. Arms Sales to The Middle East 1990-92
Source: New World Orders: "Arms Control Today" vol 22 (September
1992) p. 36-7
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sales in the past few years, have fallen but the region still
accounts for 21 percent of the world market" 4 5
In the future the United States will have to contend
with proliferation of nuclear arms in the region (Israel) and
those seeking to acquire them (Iran and Iraq). The demise of
the U.S.S.R. has provide a vast array of sources in which
these nations can purchase weapons, and upset the fragile
balance in the region.
Iran's purchase of Russian Kilo class submarines and
missile boats from China... have the Gulf states,
particularly Oman and Saudi Arabia, indicating their
desires to strengthen their Anti-Submarine warfare
capabilities to counter the threat 4 6
These issues will force the U.S. to analyze and
weigh the pros, cons, and viability of arms control
initiatives versus maintaining our present flexible policy of
arms to our allies. This is particularly important in light
of some signs of stress being exhibited by Saudi Arabia
internally and externally.
4 5 Edward D. Schafer RADM., "Naval Intelligence Annual Posture




IV. POTENTIAL AREAS OF INSTABILITY IN SAUDI ARABIA
From its very inception the house of Saud has been
single minded in their pursuit of stability. As history has
repeatedly shown,
the most fundamental value of the Saudi regime is
security, both its internal and external threats, and the
maintenance of domestic, political and social
stability. 4 7
The realization that past conflicts within the ruling
family over regional power, wealth, and territory only served
to at the very least weaken their control of the country and
at its most extreme case total loss of control, has had a
lasting impact on each government since the reign of Muhammad
ibn Saud.
Internal stability is sought through the vigorous
centralization of political control, so that maintenance
of the authority of the ruling elite tends to ervade
almost all political activity inside the kingdom.8
Since the creation of the modern state under Muhammad
Abdel-Aziz, there has been a clear understanding that there
are two fundamental threads that hold together this diverse
polity:
4 7Adeed Dawisha, Saudi Arabia's Search for Security
(London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979),
p. 6.
4 8 Ibid., p.6
34
"* adherence to Islamic principles
"* maintaining their reputation as a champion of Islam
If Saudi Arabia loses its prestige as protector of the
holy places of Mecca and Medina, and as a bastion of pure
Islamic values, the regime will also have lost much of its
credibility and legitimacy.
This claim to legitimacy is crucial as Saudi Arabia is
one of the few remaining absolute monarchies and thus more
vulnerable to internal and external pressures, than are
nations who citizens are afforded more political
participation. It has been in large part their oil wealth and
economic development that has permitted the government to
ameliorate the strains associated with the transformation of
their society into a modern economic and social structure.
A. SOCIO-POLITICAL
Currently there are several areas of potential instability
in the political and economic spheres that could threaten the
current governments control.
1. Internal
One cannot study the Middle East, without discussing
the profound impact religion has had on these societies and
the institutions they established. Unlike western Democracies,
there is no conceptual framework for Arab nations of
separation of church and state. Saudi Arabia is no exception,
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for them as well as many other Arab states religion and
government are inextricably bound.
Islam as a motivator of Saudi policies and a purveyor of
Saudi-elite attitudes is particularly potent. While other
Moslem countries can boast thriving civilizations that
pre-dated the advent of Islam... Saudi Arabia's cultural
heritage and historical legacy is traceable to the Islamic
civilization alone. 4 9
Islamic principles are strictly adhered to in the
everyday lives of Saudi citizens and visitors alike. Even
neighboring states have been influenced by the Saudi's
stringent Wahhabi religious beliefs.
When Saudi Arabia is displeased with one of her neighbors
a more puritanical enforcement of Islamic principles is
its typical response 50
Even with all the attention paid to ensuring the
ruling family and elites are perceived as righteous and just
in their rule, 'here have always been critics of the regime.
Currently, the primary challenge to the Saudi government is
posed by the Islamic revivalist movements which denounce
hereditary monarchies as un-Islamic and castigate the al-Saud
family as corrupt custodians of Islam's holy places.
4 9 Dawisha., p.9
5 0Saudi Arabia's vast oil wealth has allowed it to fulfill her
self proclaimed role as protector of the faith and foster obedience
to Islam. This social pressure is facilitated through the giving or
withholding of her foreign aid, Dawisha., p.10
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a. Islamic Activism
Various groups have used the Islamic religion for
the promotion of views on everything from morality to
politics. Typically these movements oppose non-Islamic
government, however, in the case of Saudi Arabia, it is an
issue of one group believing it is more Islamic than another.
The demographic characteristics of this group are
extremely diverse:
these Islamic organizations have attracted the educated
and professionals (teachers, engineers, lawyers,
scientists, bureaucrats, the military). Many of the
leaders of the Islamic organizations are graduates of
major universities from faculties of medicine and
engineering. Modern technology has been harnessed both
conservative clergy and political activist alike 5
According to John Esposito an author on several
books on Islamic resurgence including The Islamic threat, many
of these groups have different beliefs, ideology, and methods
on how to attain revise or overthrow the current group in
power, yet there are some similarities in their beliefs:
* Islamic activists believe that dependence on or imitation
of the west has been responsible for a failure of
political systems throughout much of the Muslim world
* Modernizing reformers are accused of encouraging the
westernization and secularization of Muslim societies, a
blind pursuit of "valueless" social change
51 John Esposito., The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?
(London: Oxford University Press, 1992), p.10
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0 They reject politico-military dependence on the west 5 2
For these Islamic groups all that is wrong with
society can be attributed to a moving away from the virtues
and principles of Islam. For them Islam becomes the panacea to
correct all ills in society, via the infusion throughout
society with Islamic principles.
The Islamic groups in Saudi Arabia are relatively
small in numbers, however they have been becoming increasingly
vocal, particularly after the Persian Gulf War. Their
criticisms are finding a broader audience who are sympathetic
and supportive of their views.
These ultra-conservative opposition groups criticize the
government for permitting interest in banking, for making
alliances with atheistic powers such as the United States,
for abusing their royal privileges, and for disregarding
the Islamic concept of governing, which is shura or
consultation5 3
In essence the Islamic groups have been riding a high
off of the feelings of inadequacy many Saudi citizens felt
after the Gulf War. Many questioned why Saudi Arabia could not
defend itself and was so dependent on foreign assistance.
5 2 In Saudi Arabia there are many Islamic fundamentalist groups
the three group's views reflected in this research are: The Muslim
Brotherhood, the Mutawin, and the more recent Human Rights
commission. Testimony of John Esposito, Professor at the college of
Holy Cross before the subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of
the House Foreign Affairs Committee, June 24, 1985
5 3Caryle Murphy, "Saudi Arabia: A True Islamic Society?,"
The New York Times 28 April 1992, p. A 19
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More importantly for what purpose had the government been
spending all those billions of dollars in sophisticated
defense systems and weaponry, if they still were so dependent
on the United States?
The Mutawin known formally as the Committee
for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of
Vice, are enforcers of an austere, often anti-
western fundamentalism. 5 4
These guardians of the faith since 1990 have been
stepping up their activity. They have conducted raids on
homes, enforced public prayer, and the prohibition of alcohol
and segregation of the sexes. Although this is their
customary role, the vigilant and zealous manner in which they
have recently decided to enforce Islamic principles is a
departure from that role.
Earlier this year a group of 6 militant scholars
announced the formation of a Human Rights Committee
They were expected to use this platform to press
demands to further institutionalize the power of the
Islamic clergy over saudi society and restrain the
pace of modernization 5 5
The Saudi Government sensitive to any internal
conflict was unusually lenient on these groups. However the
54 The Mutawin has a long tradition in the Islamic faith and
was institutionalized by the state in the 1930's. The Mutawin are
empowered to educate, encourage prayer, and in cases of public
flouting of Islamic law to apprehend offenders. Tony Horowitz,
"With the Gulf War Over, Saudi Fundamentalist Reassert Themselves,"
The Wall Street Journal 2 May 1991, p.A1
5 5youssef M. Ibrahim, "Saudis Crack down on a Dissident
Islamic Group," The New York Times 14 May 1993, p.
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limiti seemed to have been reached with the forming of this
particular group. The Saudi government immediately removed the
leaders from their positions at the university and ordered the
closure of two fundamentalist lawyer offices. Other measures
to control extremists were also enacted:
"* banned the collection of money for charitable Muslim
causes inside Saudi Arabia without the expressed
permission of the Interior minister. This was an attempt
to restrain the flow of money to these groups estimated to
be approximately one million dollars
"* instituted an active intelligence exchange with Egypt and
Tunisia
"* highly publicized the crackdown on extremist as a warning
to other factions 56
b. Modernists
The major antagonists to the Fundamentalist groups
are the members of the middle class, many of whom have been
educated in the west and have been exposed to western
Democratic principles. Modernists who are also small in
numbers believe that Saudi Arabia
which has virtually modernized all aspects of material
life, roads, telecommunications, transportation, cannot
become a truly modern nation if it remains shackled by
religious fundamentalists 5 7
56 Ibid., p.
"
5 7 Youssef Ibrahim, "Arid Times now for Saudi Arabia's
Modernizers," The New York Times ii November 1991, p. A4
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These modernist welcome foreign exposure to the
kingdom, in hopes that it would bring greater diversity to a
country tightly guarded from the outside world. The request
that holds the highest priority for this group is more
representation in the governing process. They have and will in
the future continually press King Fahd for greater
participation in the future.
King Fahd in response, has established a consultative
council and a set of constitutional articles. This council
provides an outlet for discussion of government operations to
Saudi citizens.
The royal decree gives some of the govenors more autonomy,
however, the power still rests with the King who can
disband them at anytime. It also broadens the line of
succession from just the sons of King Abdel-aziz Bin
Abdelrahman al-Saud, to the sons of his sons... voting for
an heir will be in the form of an electoral
college.... 5 8
The King is quick to stress to the modernist as well
as western liberals that this new council was established in
accordance with Islamic law, and would not be resemble any
western form of liberal Democracy (refer to Appendices A & B)
5 8 Youssef Ibrahim., "Saudi King Revisea System of Governing",
The new York Times, 2 March 92, p.Al
Appendix A Ibid., p A8
Appendix B Ibid., p A8
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C. Junior Princes and Ruling Elite
The vast numbers of princes and royal family
members is potentially destabilizing for the monarchy.
Personal ambitions and secret agendas was the cause of the
monarchies loss of power in the eighteenth century. This power
jockeying is present to this day.
The growing assertiveness of a second generation of well
educated, wealthy, and ambitious princes competing for not
only lucrative business opportunities but for positions of
influence in the ruling family 5 9
2. External
Saudi Arabia began their bid to ensure stability on
the peninsula, by in 1974 settling her longstanding dispute
with the united Arab Emirates over the Burami Oasis. The
Saudis also attempted to help their neighbors ability to
counteract any internal or external threats to their survival.
In fact, by the end of 1979, Saudi Arabia had
succeeded in coordinating the activities of the various
intelligence organizations and establishing Saudi Arabia as
the central overseer of security activities in the area.
The ultimate achievement of the al-Saud family's
efforts to establish their influence on the peninsula is
likely the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council(GCC),
composed of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE, and
"59Caryle Murphy "Glass Ceiling in the House of Saud: Princes
find few Jobs at the top," The New York Times 15 March 1992, P.A 25
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Oman, which was formed in 1981, with aim to "coordinate and
unify the economic, industrial, and defense policies." 6 0
a. Iraq
Although Iraq's invasion of Kuwait has been
reversed, although not neutralized, the Saudis have been
forced, through it to realize that they cannot ignore the
potential threat from the north. Although Iraq has substantial
oil reserves of its own, the Ba'ath party, under Saddam's
leadership, still maintains its claim to Kuwait, and thus
remains a threat to the future security of the peninsula.
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait shattered the goodwill that had been
cultivated between Saudi Arabia and Iraq during the Iran-Iraq
war, when the Saudis and other Gulf states had helped to bank
roll Saddam's war efforts, in the spirit of Arab unity.
For the Foreseeable future, concern over Iraq's intentions
will be a major priority for Saudi security.
b. Iran
The greater long-term problem, however is the
threat of Iranian hegemony over the Gulf region. To the relief
of the al-Saud family, Iranian shia fundamentalist politics
have not been well received among the largely Sunni
population. However, if Iran's revolutionary leaders begin to
experience major internal problems as they fail to deliver an
6 0Richard F. Nyrop, ed., Saudi Arabia: A country Study
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), P. 53
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improving lifestyle to their people, they may turn their
attention across the Gulf, and attempt to rally their people
against the corrupt al-Saud. While direct action against the
Saudis seems unlikely, its Islamic fundamentalist rhetoric and
long-standing irredentist claim to Bahrain are destabilizing
to the Gulf's status quo.
c. Arab-Israeli Conflict
Finally and issue that has been at the fore front
of Saudi foreign policy since the introduction of Zionists
into Palestine. The multi-lateral negotiations that gave the
Palestinians autonomy in the Gaza strip and Jericho. The peace
sought by all parties including Saudi Arabia has lasted about
as long it took the ink to dry on the official documents. The
increased violence by extremist on both the Israeli and
Palestinian side who were dissatisfied with the terms of the
settlement is likely to have the result of adding to the
support of Islamic fundamentalist groups. A consequence the
Saudis find particularly distressing, since these groups
challenge the Wahhabi state's claim to Islamic leadership.
B. ECONOMIC
1. Modernization
The great wealth which has been made available to the
Saudis through the exploitation of their oil reserves has been
a blessing. It has allowed the al-Saud family provide for
development of the society, provide for their defense, and
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ameliorate the strains of transformation of their society into
a modern economic and social structure. In the beginning "oil
revenues increased slowly limiting the economic development
that could be financed. In the 70's, however, oil revenues
skyrocketed, rising from $ 4.3 billion in 1973 to 22.6 billion
in 1974."61
As indicated in the following figure, by 1981 their highest
revenue intake, oil rents surpassed 100 billion dollars." 6 2
Oil Production and Income
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6 1Nyrop., p. 135
62 Moshe Brawer, ed., Atlas of the Middle East
(New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1988) p.60
Figure IV-l Oil Production and Income
45
This new found wealth allowed the Saudis to embark on
a massive modernization program. Plans for education, health,
and social programs were initiated.
However the biggest plans were reserved for the
modernization of its major industrial complexes Jubail
and Yanbo. The modernization plan was designed to make
Saudi Arabia less dependent on oil6 agricultural
assistance, and outside intervention.
However shortage of labor and regional conflict were
to detract from total concentration on rebuilding of their
infrastructure. The acquiring of large sums of Petro dollars
had its benefits, such as allowing Saudi Arabia to catapult
itself into the modern world, yet there were major drawbacks
such as increased regional security concerns, mainly in the
form of the establishment of the state of Israel and Soviet
expansionist tendencies in the Middle Eastern region. The
divergence of oil profits to defense expenditures was to
become a staple of the Saudi National security agenda.
2. Defense Expenditures
Many have characterized the Saudi Kingdom as a country
built on a stack of folding cards due to its heavy reliance on
its oil production capabilities and the revenue it creates.
Any decline in this area would expose the internal
vulnerability of the kingdom and severely curtail their
defense program. The Saudis know from experience that a
6 3 peter Hobday, Saudi Arabia Today: An Introduction to the
Richest Oil Power (New York: St. Martin Press, 1978) p. 48-9
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decrease in the oil market is not in their best interest, so
as a major member of the Oil Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), they have learned to manipulate various factors at
Work in the International oil market.
Saudi Arabia unlike many of the OPEC members and
international oil exporters, can afford to spend their oil
rents (profits above the cost of production), as they see fit
for two reasons:
"* Their rents are far above what is needed to support
their populations
"* They have the largest proven reserves allowing them to
produce oil for many years to come"64
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64Rafic Boustani, Phillippe Fargues, ed., The Atlas of the
Arab World: Geopolitics and Society (New York: Facts on File, 1990)
p.85 Figure IV- 2 Proven Reserves of Crude Oil at the end of the
1980's
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There is a caveat to this, it is in Saudi Arabia's
interest to keep the price of oil per barrel at a moderate
level, in order to maximize long term profits.
Ignoring this point will give their customers incentive to
look for alternate sources of energy and/or new suppliers.
The Saudis never want to lose their ability to control the
market. So the Saudi leadership:
will price their energy just below the costs of their
closest competitors. Because of their reserves, they have
little economic incentive to curtail development of their
fields, which allows them to meet the demands for this
century, at prices that prevailed in the mid 80's. 6 5
6 5 By the mid-late seventies consumers learned to conserve
energy. Gas and coal prices expanded while oil demand contracted.
Future behavior predicts that competing alternative fuels will hold
down the oil price cycle. As this commodity is Saudi Arabia's
primary source of revenue, it is in their best interest not to
price themselves out of the market. Robert E. Looney, "World Oil
Market Outlook: Implications for Stability in the Gulf States"
Middle East Review. (1989/90), 32-3
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The pattern of defense expenditures for Saudi Arabia
has been consistently increasing. From 1985-1989, Saudi Arabia
ranked first in the area of military imports as a percentage
of total world sales (see Figure iv-4 below)66
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The amount in U.S. dollars from the period of 1984-
1990 ranged from approximately 2.5-14 billion dollars (see
Figure iv-5 below) 6 7
Saudi Arabia's annual defense expenditures continued
to increase despite downturns on the economic stage. To
minimize the effect domestically, the Saudis chose to initiate
an economic development program.
67 Figure IV-5 New York Times " Saudi Stability Hit by
Spending over the Last Decade" 22 August 1993
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V a,
This program was an attempt to:
Widen the tax base by increasing the taxes on foreign
workers, decrease the number of items subsidized, and
Secure loans from home and abroad6 8
The policies theoretically were a step in the right
direction, however the implementation of the program was too
extreme, and sent shock waves throughout the country. This
culminated in the reversal of policies due to the high
political costs associated with their implementation.
A more modest approach was needed and in response the
kingdom initiated a series of five stage economic development
programs.
"* First Plan: (1970-75) a modest program for economic and
social development
"* Second Plan: (1975-80) due to a substantial increase in
oil revenue, a massive urban modernization plan was
implemented, particular emphasis was placed on increasing
the industrial output in Yanbo and Jubail
"* Third Plan: (1980-85) This strategy called for lessening
of dependence on foreign sources, especially in the
agricultural sector and attempted to provide incentives
for more private investment in the economy.
"* Fourth Plan: (1985-90) This plan focused on the civilian
sector with emphasis on non-oil revenue-generating
activities. This plan advocated greater economic and
social integration and cooperation between the Gulf
states
"* Fifth Plan: (1990-95) This plan was to focus primarily on
defense 34W, education receiving 19%, and health and
social services 12%,"69
68 Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1988 Vol XII " Saudi
Arabia" p. 678
69 The Middle East and North Africa, 1992 ed., "Saudi Arabia"
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The approximately ten year economic downturn and trade
imbalance from 1983-'93, coupled with a "spending ratio of
38:1 in the late 80's, on defense spending vs health and
social services" 7 0 , begins to highlight some very real
systemic problems for rent seeking states, like Saudi Arabia.
(refer to figure iv-6 below) 71
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These issues must be addressed if they are to insure
their stability and prosperity for the future. Saudi Arabia
has and will continue to be faced with the issue of "guns" vs
"butter", and a novel word they seem to be unaware of or
7 0Yahaya Sadowski, "The Middle East and Arms Control",
Middle East Report, July-August 1992, p. 6
71 fiGure iv-6 The New York Times "Saudi Stability Hit By
Heavy Spending Over Last Decade," 2 August 1993, p. 12
52
refuse to acknowledge.., sufficient. This can be summed up by
stating that the inability of the Saudis to make decisions
about defense expenditures in times of recession and
austerity, has been detrimental to their overall economic
health. short sighted goals of increased spending in times of
economic boom, indicates a lack of planning for bust cycles
that are inherent in the nature of fluctuating oil markets.
The precarious balance that the Saudis must keep as it
pertains to the world market, coupled with labor shortages,
poorly structured economic infrastructure, and consistent
internal and external threat, would seem to dictate a more
pragmatic savings and expenditure program.
It has been established that Saudi Arabia, one of the
United States principal allies, is heavily dependent on a
commodity that is market sensitive and at times potentially
unstable, as a key player in U.S. strategic planning, what




A. U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT SAUDI ARABIA'S STABILITY
The United States and Saudi Arabian special relationship,
is like all other aspects of U.S. foreign and Defense policy;
in a state of transition. This relationship is a by product of
the Cold war and its various political realities, and as such
should be carefully scrutinized.
"* First, to ensure that the sixty-one year relationship
between the two nations still fulfills the needs of both
countries
"* Secondly, in light of the U.S. reduction of its forces and
the realities of operating a viable force on limited
capital resources, the U.S. should ensure that our allies
are able to assume the missions that are now beyond the
control and capability of the United States
These two issues are of vital importance as the U.S. tries
to define its role in this inherently unstable multi-polar
system. It is no longer feasible for the U.S to consistently
be at the helm or continue to have a paternalistic thrust to
its policies toward its allies.
The degree of consensus building that was demonstrated
during the Persian Gulf war, despite the diverse interests and
backgrounds of the nations that formed the western alliance,
is a positive indicator of what shared responsibility can
accomplish.
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Although the United States spear-headed the mission in
this instance, in other conflicts we will and should see other
participants in the alliance change, and the leadership should
follow suit. Our allies particularly in the Middle East should
be being groomed to assume this new leadership role.
Consensus building with shared political and fiscal
responsibility, is the vehicle that will help the U.S. address
the challenges of the future. For this to be a viable option,
it is important that the U.S. not repeat its tendency to
vacillate between international participation and
isolationism, but to identify a moderate but clear position,
one that favors being an influential actor among many, vice
an influential actor operating unilaterally. The latter allows
allies like Saudi Arabia to be reactive instead of proactive
in its foreign policy objectives and in meeting its national
and regional security needs.
1. Bottom Up Review...The New Grand Strategy
Clearly, supporting policies that enhance our allies
will always be an integral part of the United States national
security policy. U.S Defense strategy as articulated by former
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin
.. large forces can threaten regions important to the
United States, because allies and friendly states are
unable to match the power of such a potentially aggressive
neighbor.. .we must prepare our forces to assist .... 72
72 Les Aspin., The Bottom UD Review,
(Washington D.C. : U.S. Department of Defense, 1993), p. 5
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The means by which this is to be accomplished is:
via the promotion of new regional security arrangements
and alliances, to improve deterrence and reduce potential
aggression by hostile regional powers. Also the expansion
and adaptation of our existing security partnerships and
alliances .... 73
For the United states, oil and Gulf security will
also always figure prominently in its security agenda. A long
term approach would have a U.S. Rapid Defense Force (RDF),
physically located on the peninsula. In the Aftermath of the
Gulf war there are plans to have "a brigade in Kuwait and
preposition a second one somewhere on the peninsula" 7 4
From the United States perspective, Saudi Arabia
would be ideal for the second area, however, its internal
politics could not absorb the political fall-out of such a
plan. The U.S should continue to assist the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) to shore up that security alliance, by
providing:
"* provide training
"* engage in Joint Contingency Planning
"* Joint exercises and maneuvers
"* develop a Command, Control, and Communications Systems for
future joint operations
73 Ibid., p. 2
74 Ibid., p. 15
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* enhanced intelligence sharing7 5
The Bottom Up Review is just the next phase of the
Grand strategic approach, it is an initial starting point
focusing on ideas, on how to reshape the armed forces of
today, in order to meet the changes and challenges in the
future. flexibility and fiscal responsibility are two concepts
that in the future will direct our foreign policy goals and
actions.
2. Economics and Politics
In keeping with the Grand strategic approaches method of
analysis, the self inflicted economic stress that Saudi Arabia
presently faces, should be a case of great concern to the U.S.
Saudi Arabia our remaining pillar may become an albatross
around our necks if the economic trends of the last decade,
and particularly the downward economic trend after the Gulf
war, continue without any genuine modification.
The Saudi government's involvement in the
Persian Gulf War has only exacerbated and
already declining Saudi economy and steeply
cut into its capital reserves 7 6 .
The United States concerns were verbalized by Richard G.
Darman, President Bush's Budget Director, when he announced to
Congress:
7 5
"A Postwar Gulf Defense System: Towards a New Middle East"
(Washington D.C.: Coalition for Postwar U.S.policy in the Middle
East, April 1991) p. 8-9
7 6Stephen Engelberg, "Saudi Stability Hit By Heavy Spending
Over The Last Decade," The New York Times, 22 August 1993, p.12
57
The war and weapon sales has put Saudi Arabia under
considerable economic stress. They are now borrowing
considerably to service their own needs
7 7
Other areas of concern are:
* The seeking of credit, and an ease in terms of payment for
requested military purchases, and the cancellation of some
military hardware
* 121 billion in Saudi financial reserves were virtually
drained and From 1989 - 1992 increases in government debt
to Saudi banks rose from 15.1 billion from 4 billion 78
* Sharp decline in military trust fund. In early 1992 the
cash had dwindle so low it was close to the point at which
stop work orders must be sent to contractors.
7 9
The failure of the Saudi regime to contract its
expenditures during slack times has had serious consequences
for it in the world financial market.
The Inter-Agency country exposure Review Committee a group of
federal bank regulators reviewed their credit rating. There
were calls for a downgrading of Saudi Arabia's credit status
and only after a member of the Treasury Department Elizabeth
Hughes arqued their case did the board give Saudi Arabia a
reprieve. 0
The United States has a great deal to be concerned
about if Saudi Arabia does not reallocate resources from
7 7Stephen Engelberg, "U.S. - Saudi Deals in '90's Shifting Away
from Cash Toward Credit," The New York Times, 21 August 1993, p.A6
7 8Stephen Engelberg, "Saudi Stability Hit by Heavy Spending
Over The Last Decade," The New York Times, 22 August 1993, p. 1, 12
79Stephen Engelberg, "U.S-Saudi Deals of the '90's Shifting
Away from Cash Toward Credit," The New York Times, 22 August 1993,
p. A6
8 0 Ibid., p.A6
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defense and get its financial affairs managed. Saudi Arabia's
monarchy has maintained power due to it ability to finesse the
intricate political and social problems associated with
modernization and by paying off potential enemies, and giving
subsidies to its neighbors. Saudi Arabia's quest for security
to the exclusion of everything else, has left them vulnerable
to Islamic FundamentaList influences.
U.S. support of Democratic reforms has had a messianic
quality about it since the demise of numerous Communist
states. The Democratic wave has not overlooked Saudi Arabia
who vehemently opposes western inspired democratic governing
in Saudi Arabia. The U.S. should not get caught making its
judgements on modernist calls for liberalization, and
pressuring the Saudis to integrate our principles in their
government. The U.S. should only concern itself with one basic
premise. A Democratic government is not a prerequisite for
relations with the U.S., as long as the central power actions
and goals are in alignment with U.S. objectives, a positive
relationship can be fostered, regardless of its professed
political orientation. This is the case with Saudi Arabia:
it espouses fundamentalists principles but... there is a
discrepancy between rhetoric and actions 81
The pattern of events economically and politically
81 Daniel Pipes., "Islamic Muslims and U.S. Policy,"
(Washington D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1984), p,.3
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is not compatible with the United States strategy for regional
influence in the Middle East, access to moderately priced oil,
and maintaining a friendly ally in a strategically and
volatile region. Saudi Arabia has yet to show the political
will to change it strategic thinking or fiscal spending
patterns. In long term planning the United States must be
prepared to have an alterative to Saudi Arabia or provide
incentives for them to re-orientate their economy so that it
is mutually beneficial to both countries.
Failure to do this will only serve to strengthen
internal critics of the regime. The islamic fundamentalist
strain that is the under current of Saudi society will always
curtail the range of options available to both the U.S and the
Saudi government. The assistance that we give to Saudi Arabia
must be unintrusive so as not to upset the internal balance of
the kingdom. A plan focusing on cooperation is more
appropriate for the future, this concept implies an
equalization of power, and the amelioration of some of the
factors that make U.S presence highly visible and disrupt
Saudi society.
3. Arms
Saudi Arabia's purchase of arms has in many instances
led to its current problems. Security concerns has caused them
to purchase weapons for deterrence purposes, as well as,
ensure their stability in the region. The Gulf war showed
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that these weapons were mere symbols of prestige rather than
instruments of security.
The issues of arms proliferation is extremely
problematic for the U.S., who for decades followed policies
that facilitated the arms race. Arms sales have been extremely
profitable for the U.S. and has helped the domestic economy,
however in these constrained economic times to continue to
expect Saudi Arabia to carry the U.S. Defense industry is not
in either parties best interests in the long-term. Saudi
Arabia's ability to absorb more military equipment has reached
a point of saturation:
it cannot help create jobs, help the defense industry
transition out of the Cold war, improve U.S. balance of
payments, or make Saudi Arabia safe.... Increases in
weapon sales would sharply increase Saudi debt and
dependence on America, and give fundamentalists ammunition
against the government.. .the U.S. would be creating
instability for Saudi Arabia 8 2
Finally, U.S. unilateral constraints on arms control
will not create regional stability. With the wealth of arms
producing nations such as the former Soviet states,
availability of supply will not be an issue for Middle Eastern
states who want to acquire them. The U.S can encourage Saudi
Arabia to curtail its arms procurement, but if security
continues to supersede all other factors Saudi Arabia will get
its hardware from these other sources.
82 Stephen Engleberg., "U.S Saudi Deals in 90's Shifting Away
From Cash Toward Credit", The New York Times, 21 August 1993, p.A6
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The areas of instability highlighted in this research are
not intended to be a fatalistic forecast on the state of
relations between these two countries, it is a examination of
real problems that exist in the alliance and within Saudi
Arabia that the U.S. should consider when formulating its
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